Abstract. Since the 1990s, two technologies have reshaped how we see and experience the world around us. These technologies are the Internet and mobile communication, especially smartphones. The Internet provides a cheap and convenient way to explore and communicate with distant people. A multitude of services have converged on the smartphone platform, and potentially the most notable is social networking. With increased interconnectivity and use of online services, concerns about consumers' security and privacy are growing. In this paper, we evaluate the security-and privacy-preserving features provided by existing mobile chat services. This paper also puts forwards a basic framework for an End-to-End (E2E) security and privacy-preserving mobile chat service and associated requirements. We implemented the proposal to provide proof-of-concept and evaluate the technical diculty of satisfying the stipulated security and privacy requirements.
Introduction
The instant messaging services provided by applications like WhatsApp, Apple iMessage and BlackBerry Messenger are overtaking traditional SMS services [1] , becoming the preferred medium of communication for millions of smartphone users 1 . However, the security and privacy-preserving features of dierent mobile applications have come under the spot-light [3] . There are dierent security and privacy features provided by dierent mobile chat applications, but there are not many mobile chat applications that provide an End-to-End (E2E) security and privacy-preserving service to their customers.
In this paper, we focus on such a mobile chat service. We propose a framework for building such a service and then evaluate the technical challenges involved in implementing it, to provide a proof-of-concept and understand any potential technical issues which may restrict such features from being implemented by mainstream mobile chat service providers.
1 Financial Times report [1] put the number of daily instant messages at 41billion and WhatsApp has more than 200 million active monthly users [2] .
Contributions of the Paper
This paper deals with the security and privacy-related challenges faced in the design, development and maintenance of a mobile chat service. The main contributions of this study are:
1. End-to-End (E2E) security and privacy-preserving architecture for mobile chat services 2. Secure key exchange, even when communicating parties are not online (i.e.
for oine messages)
3. User-to-User (U2U) authentication mechanism 2 4 . Implementation analysis of proposed architecture
Structure of the Paper
Section 2 discusses the evolution of mobile phone technology and how mobile chat is becoming a convenient method of communication. In section 3, we explore the existing commercial applications that provide dierent degrees of security and privacy features. In addition, we also stipulate the security and privacy requirements for an E2E secure and privacy-preserving mobile chat service.
Subsequently, we describe the proposed framework along with the details of crucial operations. In section 4, practical implementation experience is presented.
Section 5 provides an overall analysis of the proposed/implemented framework.
Finally in section 6 we provide potential future research directions and conclude the paper.
Mobile Phones
In this section, we briey visit smartphone technology in order to understand the scale of the market, which directly relates to the security and privacy concerns of mobile chat users.
Smartphones: A Paradigm Shift
The mobile phone platform has evolved a long way from the original simple medium of voice and text communication to become the hub of the digital world.
Mobile phones, along with being an entertainment hub, have also developed into a social construct that has aliations and emotional attachments for individuals.
It is also becoming the predominant medium for connecting with the world through social media sites/applications [4, 5] .
The so-called App Culture promoted by Apple Inc. [6, 7] , has enabled users to seamlessly download any application they desire. This has opened the smartphone platform to a wide range of companies and services. One of the most 2 An authentication mechanism that enables individual users to authenticate each other during a chat session without involving the respective chat servers. prominent services provided by dierent applications on smartphones is mobile chat. It provides a potentially convenient and cost-eective alternative to traditional voice and SMS 3 . Mobile chat services have the potential to eclipse SMS communication and this trend is becoming more obvious on a daily basis [1] .
With consumers' increasing reliance on mobile chat services, security and privacy features are becoming serious concerns [8, 9] .
Consumers use a mobile chat service to communicate with each other, a process that can include relaying personal information. The security and privacy of such communications should be taken seriously. However, recent episodes of vulnerability in the major chat services (i.e. WhatsApp [10] ) reveal that they might not be robustly implementing security and privacy features.
In the following sections, we briey explore the range of mobile chat applications available on Android and iOS. This discussion provides an analysis of existing work in the commercial arena. In section 2.6, we discuss existing academic work related to security and privacy-preserving chat software. The selection of commercially available chat software was made in a manner that reects the existing approaches, and it is by no means an exhaustive list.
WhatsApp
WhatsApp is considered to be one of the biggest mobile chat services available on dierent platforms (e.g. iOS, and Android). The architecture of the service is proprietary and the details in this section are taken from a range of resources; notably from [11] . The main focus of the product is on messaging and privacy concerns are secondary. WhatsApp does not store any messages on the server: the chat history is stored on the client's device. The client application uses SSL [12] to connect to the server; however, a recent blog posting [10] 
Wickr
The most recent addition to the range of secure chat applications is Wickr.
Although most of their architecture is proprietary, in this section we discuss the features they claim to oer 4 . They claim that they encrypt individual messages using a cryptographic key. However, it is dicult to determine whether these keys are generated by the message server or the clients. They only claim that users' private keys are not communicated to the server. Furthermore, it is claimed that device, location and Meta information about users and messages is protected, providing a strong privacy mechanism. Communication between the device and the message server is protected by TLS [14] .
Silent Text
Similar to mobile chat applications discussed above, the complete architectural Each message is encrypted with a new key that is expanded/derived from a master secret shared between the communicating entities. The message server does not handle any key material and does not store any messages. To share the master secret, the communicating entities have to exchange several messages (before they can actually communicate). It is not clear from their white paper [15] and website whether their key sharing protocol supports oine communication 6 .
Related Work
Security and privacy issues in relation to smart phones have received considerable attention [16, 17, 18] with regard to mobile chat applications. Although there are a number of mobile chat applications that claim to provide a secure service, their complete architecture is not publicly available. To our best knowledge there are not many publications that describe such systems. Secure text messaging systems have a strong foundation in proposals like Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP (ZRTP) [19] , O-the-Record (OTR) [20] and A Secure Text Messaging Protocol [21] . In this paper, we aim to present a potential architecture along with security and privacy-preserving architecture to provide a complete architecture, thereby lling the gap in the existing work in the area of mobile chat applications.
4 Claims were made on their website https://www.mywickr.com/en/howitworks.php 5 Silent text website https://silentcircle.com/web/silent-text/ In this section, we rst discuss the security and privacy requirements of mobile chat applications. In the remaining part of this section, we detail a proposed architecture and describe its features.
Secure and Privacy Preserving Mobile Chat Requirements
Before we present the details of the proposed architecture for mobile chat appli- Req8 To safeguard the privacy of the users and their chat, the message-server should not be able to retrieve the messages.
Proposed Architecture
The generic architecture of a secure and privacy-preserving mobile chat application is shown in Figure 1 .
After downloading a mobile chat application, the user of mobile`A' initiates the sign-up process. The sign-up process is used either to create a new account or to sign in using an existing account (credentials). The chat server, which consists of a membership server and a message server, initiates the account creation process. The membership server manages the user's accounts, associated credentials and (optionally) the user's contact-list. The message server handles the message communication between users, whether both users are online or if the intended recipient is oine. If the recipient is oine, the message will be stored in the oine message store. These messages are temporarily stored and once they are delivered to the respective recipients they are deleted. 
Key Exchange Two Users
A point to note is that the key and cryptographic-algorithm choice shared by the sender communicates to the receiver that when decrypting any future messages from this sender, she should use them, as shown in Figure 3 . Similarly, the receiver will also send the key share message shown in Figure 2 encrypted by the sender's public key. Therefore, both users will use their own generated keys to encrypt all their outgoing messages. The only dierence in a group chat is that the chat organiser (group creator/administrator) will generate the master key and share it with all participants, who will then use this key to encrypt all their messages. This avoids using multiple keys (equal to the number of users in the group) to communicate with all users in the group.
Mutual User-to-User (U2U) Authentication
Mobile chat authenticates itself to the chat server, but U2U authentication is between the users themselves. This authentication process does not involve the chat server and the objective of the process is to assure communicating entities that they are talking with the right person. The U2U authentication process has two phases: the opt-in and the authentication phase.
In the opt-in phase, users agree on establishing a U2U authentication mechanism. To accomplish this, two users will initiate the U2U opt-in phase shown If it matches then they can ascertain that the person with whom they are chatting is not an imposter A point to note is that all the messages listed in Figure 4 are communicated condentially, using the shared cryptographic keys. These messages are encrypted as if they were chat messages, which are discussed in detail in the next section. A point to note is that our mechanism is not comparable to the In our proposal, the PIN is not the account credential that the user requires to connect with the chat server. The PIN is to authenticate the user to her mobile chat application and open her prole. The PIN is not communicated by the mobile chat application to the chat server and it is stored locally. To protect the PIN value, the application has to rely on the underlying platform and its security mechanism, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Practical Implementation
Using the proposed architecture/features of the mobile chat application in the previous section, we detail the basic implementation carried out to provide a proof-of-concept for the proposed architecture. In this section, we discuss the practical implementation.
Technology Overview
As part of the design, we opted for using components that are publicly available and have the least license restrictions. For this reason, most of the features presented in the proposal are built using public libraries.
As shown in Figure 1 , the deployment of a secure chat service requires the implementation of the chat server and the mobile application. For mobile application development, we choose the Android platform [24] . The chat server was hosted on the Intel 9 Core i7, 2.70 GHz and 8GB RAM machine running Ubuntu 10 13.10.
In subsequent sections, we briey discuss the implementation experience for both the chat server and the mobile application.
Server Side Implementation
On the chat server, we deployed two logical servers. One server ran XAMPP 1.8.3
as a membership server and Mosquitto 1.2.3 as a message server. The XAMPP server is an Apache [25] distribution containing MySQL [26] , PHP [27] , and
Perl [28] . In addition to this, we also included Mcrypt [29] and OpenSSL [30] extensions.
Mosquitto [31] is an open source message server based on the MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol [32] . The most recent release of Mosquitto supports the MQTT protocol version 3.1, which provides a very lightweight messaging architecture. We chose Mosquitto for its implementation of MQTT and the rationale behind the choice of MQTT is:
9 Intel website: www.intel.com 10 Ubuntu website: www.ubuntu.com
MQTT provided several useful features, such as push notications (so that constant polling for new messages is not required by the Android-based chat application), assured message delivery and reliability, low battery usage, and also oine message delivery. Oine messages are stored on the message server until the recipient comes online, at which point these messages are sent to the recipient and removed from the server.
MQTT also provides smaller message sizes due to being a binary protocol, compared to other protocols like XMPP [33] , which uses XML [34] for its messages. Using MQTT means that text messages are smaller in size than the same messages created with other message protocols such as XMPP (an example is the two character message :), which using MQTT generates 70 bytes, whereas the same message in XMPP is represented with 100 bytes). The low data usage for communicating the message is important from the point of view of both performance (delivery of messages) and bandwidth usage (i.e. mobile data packages). fully encrypted databases, Eclipse Paho [37] for MQTT messaging and Spongy Castle 11 [39] for cryptographic algorithms. The PIN is stored in the application/share preferences, and it unlocks the SQLCipher encryption/decryption key.
11 Repackage of Bouncy Castle [38] for Android Shared master keys, (optional) chat histories, U2U authentication secrets, and contact lists are stored in the SQLCipher database.
Overall Analysis
In section, we briey analyse the architecture and implementation of our secure mobile chat service.
Analysis of the Proposed Architecture
In section 3.1, we list 12 seven basic requirements for a secure and privacy preserving chat service. Taking these seven requirements, we have provided a comparison between our proposal and commercially available products discussed in section 2. The comparison based on the listed requirements is shown in table 1. It is clear that our proposal meets all the requirements, and that one of the most widely-used mobile chat services, WhatsApp does not satisfy even half of the requirements. However, in support of WhatsApp we can argue that they do not market or claim to provide a secure and privacy-preserving chat service. Therefore, it is only natural that it does not meet the majority of the requirements.
Implementation Analysis
The objective of the implementation was to provide a proof-of-concept for constructing a secure and privacy-preserving mobile chat application with publicly available specications. Therefore, this exercise was a study of the technical difculties that a chat service provider might face in developing such a service.
12 * We do not claim that this is an exhaustive list and it should be considered as a basic list of requirements.
During our development process, we did not face any technical issues. In most cases, the important components required for such a proposed service are already present, apart from concerns about handling a large number of simultaneous connections.
We only tested the application for its features and whether it adequately supports the listed requirements (section 3.1). In addition, we did not test the scalability of the implementation of the chat server. However, with regard to message generation, the implementation was comparable to any commercially available mobile chat application. However, we cannot claim the same for the chat server as we did not simulate the load test to make it comparable to other mobile chat services. Such a test is beyond the scope of this work.
Conclusion and Future Research Directions
In this paper, we provided an open specication for a secure and privacypreserving chat service. We described the basic requirements, architecture and implementation experience in deploying such a service. The aim of the paper is to develop mobile chat services and explore any potential complexities involved in such a service providing privacy protection to its customers. In this work, we explored the theoretical foundations and technical challenges faced if privacy protection is built into a chat service. We found that most of the theoretical and technical components are already available. With a few minor modications, a strongly privacy-based chat service can be constructed. We have shown that a secure and privacy-preserving chat application is technically feasible. During the implementation of the framework, we did not face any serious issues concerning the technology or performance that might make this proposal infeasible.
Whether it is a viable business is a dierent aspect of such a service, and was not considered in this paper.
In future research, we would like to experiment with the scalability and performance of the chat server: this might reveal some bottlenecks in building and maintaining a privacy-based chat server. Another potential aspect is investigation of how the text chat service proposed in this paper could be extended to a voice and video chat service. The challenges presented in providing a secure and privacy-preserving voice and/or video chat service might be more than those presented by a text-based chat service. This will give a much better insight into the development of secure and privacy-preserving services, their running costs and usability requirements, providing an opportunity to understand the underlying reasons why such services are not prevalent or widely adopted by customers.
